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This paper considers some aspects of the effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic
adjustment in developing countries. First, the paper reviews the notion of the fiscal
deficit in the particular context of developing countries. It then spells out the conditions
under which the internal and external debts are sustainable and points out the role of the
“twin deficits”. The paper then presents some evidence on the sustainability of the
internal and external deficits in the context of some developing countries. Finally the
paper develops the theme of endogeneity of money supply to fiscal policy and
international capital flows and points out the difficulties faced by stabilization policy
under these conditions.
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1 Introduction
This paper purports to examine the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy, particularly
deficits, in developing countries. The roles of the fiscal authority in developed and
developing countries vis à vis developed countries are markedly different. In both
developed and developing countries there is a concern for raising living standards over
time, but this need is much more pronounced in developing countries, given the extent
and depth of poverty in these countries. In the relative absence or perpetual weakness of
institutions to mobilize and direct savings, the role of the state is crucial in harnessing
the resources for development. Since the regulatory apparatus is weak and market
signals imperfect, the state has an important role to play in allocating investment funds.
Further, with widespread poverty, there is the expectation that fiscal expenditures would
play a major role in anti poverty programs. Pressures for populism through price
controls and the like are considerable.
At the same time, and for some of these same reasons, the state in developing countries
is handicapped in its ability to play an activist role. First, the state in a developing
country is a weaker entity politically than in most developed countries. This means that
there is often very little consensus on the contours of a tax and expenditure program.
(See Heady (2000)). Second, the resources available with the government are meagre
since tax bases are small and tax administration weak. Much of tax revenue comes from
inefficient and distortionary indirect taxes such as excise duties. International trade is
heavily taxed. Effective personal income taxes are low and easily evaded and corporate
taxes are high. Even so expenditures routinely, and even increasingly, outpace revenues.
With poor credit and bond markets and fiscal expenditures that are inflexible in the
downward direction, some of the financing of the resultant deficit spills over onto the
external sector and the central bank.
Even within the developing country group there is considerable heterogeneity in
experience with respect to the fiscal deficit. The differences are more pronounced
between the middle and low-income country categories but they exist even within the
low-income category of countries. For example low income countries differ sharply in
regard to the depths of their financial markets. Thus in 1999 in Burkina Faso net foreign
assets as a percentage of broad money were –1.9%. The corresponding figure for India1
was 14.3%. Thus there are sharp differences within countries in the developing country
group with respect to the options available for public borrowing in the event of there
being a large fiscal deficit.
Indeed the poorest among the LDCs are caught in an insidious resource trap. (UNCTAD
(2000)). The relation between per capita income and savings appears no different in
these countries than in the presently developed nations. However, because of low per
capita incomes, savings are low and because of this economic growth is low. In
addition, as UNCTAD (2000) estimates external shocks have a far more serious effect
in the least developed countries than other developing countries. To quote this report
1 The Burkina Faso figure is taken from IMF (2000) whereas the figure for India comes from the
Reserve Bank of India Bulletin (2000).2
“The average least developed country economy has, since the 1970s, been exposed to
adverse external trade shocks with an impact, in the worst years, more or less double the
average of other developing countries”. The fact that the least developed countries can
spare far fewer resources to combat the effects of these external shocks, then,
exacerbates this problem. External finance is the obvious way to get around this sharp
resource crunch. However, such supplies are meagre. Large, stable market economies
such as India and South Africa attract considerable capital inflows whereas most poor
economize of the sub Saharan region get poor inflows. Thus in 1997 South Africa had
FDI flows of US$27,483 million and portfolio investment assets of US$7,817.77
million whereas2 the corresponding figures for Botswana were US$404 million and
US$204 million. Both FDI as well as portfolio flows are poor. FDI flows are
concentrated largely in resource extraction3. The reasons for such poor flows are not
hard to discover. These are related to “costs of asset development, risks which are
rooted in the vulnerability of the least developed countries to shocks, lack of business
support services, weak physical, social and administrative infrastructure, and the small
scale of projects” (UNCTAD (2000)).
With rapidly diminishing official aid and poor private equity flows, external financing
of the fiscal deficit in the poorest countries has to rely increasingly on private loans.
These are available at increasingly difficult terms, as Harberger (1985) has noted, as the
domestic resource cost of servicing these goes up with additional borrowing.
Furthermore, typically, this resource cost is underestimated.
Other reasons for differences across countries include continuity and stability of policy
regimes. Thus Zambia, which has had a history of policy reversals, would be associated
with higher risk than Botswana and Mauritius, which have had credible and stable
policy regimes. The costs of borrowing abroad will typically be higher for countries
with frequent reversals of policy stance as the risks associated with lending will go up
sharply.
A consequence of these factors for financing the fiscal deficit is that many of these
countries have to rely, to a considerable extent, on non-bond (monetary) financing of
the deficit. When this occurs, the distinction between fiscal policy and the monetary
base of the central bank is blurred and the independence of monetary from fiscal policy
is compromised.
This paper is addressed to several objectives. First, in Section II, I review the notion of
the fiscal deficit in the particular context of developing countries. Section III develops
the notion of sustainable fiscal deficits. It also articulates a critical deficit that makes for
a sustainable internal debt. In section IV, the notion of sustainable external debt is
articulated. Section V assesses the notion of sustainable “twin deficits”. I apply the
sustainability tests to a cross section of low and medium income countries for the period
2 T h ed a t aa r ef r o mt h eI F SC Dr o m .
3 Most of the least developed countries effectively face vertical supply curves of external capital
inflows. Various reasons can be attributed toward this. Macro policy disasters such as those in
Tanzania have played an important role. Others such as Guinea are just too small. Countries such as
Angola do manage to get some FDI in resource extraction. Angola, for example, borrows externally
by mortgaging its potential oil revenues but there are limits to this when debt rises to high levels and
additional loans can be obtained only at very high interest rates.3
since 1950. Section VI considers some problems associated with the problem of
international capital flows and indicates the difficulty of pursuing stabilization policies
under these conditions and the role that fiscal policy can play to ameliorate this
difficulty. Section VII concludes.
2 The fiscal deficit: what does it measure?
The conventional measure of the fiscal deficit as the difference between total
government expenditure and current government revenue while being clear as an
accounting concept, is not above controversy as an economic entity. Tanzi (1993) for,
example, mentions the following three difficulties: (i) the conventional measure of the
deficit fails to recognize that different tax and expenditure categories have different
types of effects on aggregate demand. For example, an excess of expenditure on the
infrastructure creates productive capacity and will have a different impact than an
excess of expenditure due to consumption subsidies4. (ii) A second problem arises
because tax revenues are not exogenous of expenditures. The level of public
expenditures determines national income, which then determines tax revenue, at least in
part. It is in this context that during the Kennedy-Johnson presidencies in the US—a
period of full employment—the notion of a full employment budget surplus was defined
and used. In the context of developing countries, such a notion would be suspect since
the binding constraint on output in their cases is not the supply of labor. A more
relevant constraint would be the availability of credit in terms of hard currencies5.
(iii) Finally there is the problem of sources of financing the deficit. In developing
countries several sources of financing have been used e.g., central bank financing,
commercial bank financing, domestic sale of government bonds to cover the deficit and
foreign financing. Each of these has different macroeconomic consequences. Central
bank financing raises the monetary base and the money supply, thereby blurring the
distinction between monetary and fiscal policies. Foreign financing will raise the cost of
servicing external debt whereas domestic bond issues will raise interest rates. An
additional difficulty is that some sources of finance are available only under certain
circumstances. For example, a country with a thin bond market (which is the case in
almost all of sub Saharan Africa except South Africa) can hardly afford to issue bonds
to cover the fiscal deficit and may have to rely on central bank financing or some such
measure. A country with large external debt would, in all probability, be able to finance
its deficit externally only by borrowing short term at high rates of interest. This would
make it difficult to finance the external debt and may put pressure on the currency.
Some authors such as Buiter (1985, 1993) have gone much further ahead and argued
that even cyclically adjusted and inflation adjusted measure of the deficit are only
imprecise indicators of the true deficit. For example, the capital gains/losses on
government assets and liabilities are not included in the conventional flow of funds
accounts. Examples of these would include changes in relative prices (say changes in
4 For a further elaboration of this point see Hermes and Lensink (2000) and Gemmell (2000).
5 The distinction is sharply illustrated by the recent experience of the US. For the past five years or so,
tax revenues in the US have been very buoyant following high employment conditions. As a result a
stubbornly high US budgetary deficit has turned into a surplus. The US economy, of course, does not
face a foreign exchange constraint so that this transformation was possible.4
mineral prices) and changes in the real value of nominal debt during an episode of
inflation.6
Particularly in those developing countries where public investment has played a
significant role in the economy, a distinction is made between revenue or current deficit
and capital deficit. The former is the deficit on expenses of a recurrent nature after
netting out investment expenditure. Surely, if a country is running a large and growing
deficit on such current transactions it is a reason for worry. However, it should be
pointed out that the distinction between capital and current expenditures is often an
artificial one (for example, in aid dependent economies, large amounts of aid-financed
current expenditure connected with aid financed projects are placed in the capital
expenditure category—the case of Mozambique, for example. It would be meaningful
only if it was clear that all capital expenditures were productive in nature. Although
capital expenditures are associated with capacity building activity, it might be the case
that some such expenditures are wasteful in nature. This would typically be the case if
the project in question has not been evaluated carefully and/or involves equipment that
is highly capital intensive or has an unduly import intensive or is, in some other way,
inappropriate for the economy. For example, a substantial part of Nigeria’s public
investments have low social rates of return, reflecting inappropriate technology choices
and long standing overvaluation of the currency that cheapened the cost of capital
equipment. Furthermore, this current or revenue deficit says nothing about the impact of
the deficit on the balance of payments or on economic growth.
There are some other problems associated with the measurement of deficits that are
worth mentioning. First, is the problem of arrears. This becomes particularly relevant in
the case of repayment of foreign debt. If, for example, the interest payment on the
foreign debt is rescheduled—which is the case in many Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPCs) such as Tanzania—should we say that the deficit has gone down?
Similarly, if the government delays some payments (often the public wage bill) whereas
it takes in all its revenues does fiscal deficit go down? These questions become
particularly relevant during a period of high inflation when delaying payments
denominated in nominal terms can have significant impact on the real value of such
payments. For example, Angola’s government receives large resource revenues from oil
but in the recent past it has nevertheless accumulated large wage arrears, the real value
of which would have declined rapidly with hyperinflation. (See Aguilar (2000)).
A further important problem arises when the fiscal deficit reported is only that of
the central government. In countries with different levels of government this would be
an inappropriate indicator of the deficit. Even if the deficits of state and lower levels of
government are included, there may be other government agencies that are running a
deficit, which does not get reflected, in the measured fiscal deficit. Examples would
include the deficits of central banks in some Latin American countries, the deficits of
local (particularly municipal) governments in India and the so-called “oil pool” deficit
in India where excesses of payments for petroleum imports over what is collected from
6 Recent arguments along the lines suggested by Buiter include those by Easterly (1999) who argues
that fiscal adjustment can be illusionary. In particular, this would be the case when such adjustment
lowers the public debt but leaves unchanged the net worth of the government. In other words,
governments may find ways of maintaining their consumption even when they are actually involved in
a process of reducing public debt.5
consumers is recorded. The oil pool deficit, for example, can become large during a
period of rises in the international prices of petroleum products and difficulties in
raising the domestic prices of such products. In the Indian7 case, for example, part of
the burden of this adjustment has been shifted to the future by issuing “oil bonds”. Such
transactions do not get reflected in the fiscal deficit. All this then tends to make the
fiscal deficit a not entirely satisfactory measure of the excess of government expenditure
over revenues.
The difficulties in measuring and interpreting the deficit notwithstanding, it is useful to
understand whether the underlying fiscal stance is sustainable. The literature on this
issue is growing rapidly. In the next section I develop the extant notion of internal debt
sustainability and apply it to select developing countries for which continuous data are
available. Subsequently the notion of external debt sustainability is discussed.
3 Sustainability of the domestic fiscal debt
Rapid accumulation of domestic debt can lead to severe macroeconomic problems, and
can impede control of the fiscal deficit itself. To take only one example, Zimbabwe’s
fiscal deficit is estimated to be close to 20 percent of GDP in 2000. “Public debt is
rising rapidly, with new debt being issued to meet interest payments (the so-called
‘Ponzi’ game). Interest payments on domestic public debt are expected to exceed 50
percent of total government revenues by end-2000, thereby squeezing development and
social spending.” (source EIU (2000)). This section develops the simple analytics of
sustainability for the domestic as well as the external deficit and applies it to a spectrum
of developing countries.
3.1 The government intertemporal budget constraint
The most straightforward way to assess the sustainability of a public debt situation is to
start from the governmental intertemporal budget constraint. This is written in nominal
terms as:
) 1 ( 1 1 - - - = + - t t t t t t B B B r T G
Where Gt is the value of government expenditures (purchases of goods and services plus
transfer payments); Bt is the government debt at the end of period t, Tt is the
7 In India the prices of petroleum products are administered by the government through an “oil pool”
mechanism. The stated purpose of this is to provide uniform and stable prices of such products to
consumers within the country and reasonable profit margins for the oil companies. The oil pool
accounts are supposed to be self financing. The inflows into the pool account are from collection of
surcharge on the sale of petroleum products while the outflow is for meeting the variation in the
elements of standard cost. The difference between inflows and outflows represents the surplus/deficit
position of the ol pool account. And is not included in the budgetary deficit of the central or state
governments. In recent years this account has persistently been in deficit since revisions to consumer
prices of petroleum products have been farr from complete. This tendency has been exacerbated with
the recent sharp rises in world petroleum prices. Some of the deficit in the oli pool account is covered
by the issue of “oil bonds” issued by the government and bought by oil companies, which can redeem
these bonds at specified future dates. See Ministry of Finance (1997).6
government’s tax revenue and rt is the one-period rate of interest payable on the
government debt. (1) states that in the absence of money finance, the government
budget deficit must be financed by new debt creation8. Hence, expressing (1) in terms
of ratios to gross GDP we will have:
) 2 ( ) ( ) 1 )( 1 ( 1
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Where the lower case letters denote the ratio of the corresponding uppercase variables
to nominal GDP: bt = Bt / PtYt; gt = Gt / PtYt;a n dtt =Tt / PtYt; with P and Y being the
price level and real GDP respectively. pt =( Pt-Pt-1)Pt-1 is the rate of inflation and ht =
(Yt-Yt-1)/ Yt-1 is the rate of growth of real GDP. In the derivation of (2) we have used the
relation that:
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(gt-tt) is the primary deficit expressed as a percentage of GDP. We have the following
cases:
Case 1: rt-pt< ht
In this case in (2) the debt ratio will stabilize and the economy will remain solvent if:
0 ) ( lim =
¥ ® t t b E
If the initial debt to GDP ratio (b0) is strictly positive, this requires two conditions:
rt-pt < ht for all t so that the debt ratio stabilizes rather than explodes. This is the so-
called sustainability condition and makes any stable path of the primary deficit
consistent with a stable public debt to GDP ratio. In addition we have condition (b) that
0 £ - t t g t on average, if not in every period, so that the debt burden is ultimately
liquidated.
These two conditions are necessary and sufficient and ensure that the debt, no matter
how large, can be paid off through tax increases or expenditure cuts or inflation. Thus
the government is solvent. The steady state (finite) value of the debt-GDP ratio is
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8 The left hand side of the government’s budget constraint must also include exchange rate changes and
privatization which reflect changes in government net debt due to revaluation of the government’s
financial assets. In the empirical work reported in this paper this broader definition is used.7
(3) emphasizes a strong link between the government’s indebtedness and its primary
deficit.
Case 2: rt-pt> ht
In this case the debt is unsustainable and the debt stock will become infinite no matter
what sequence of primary deficits are chosen unless the debt stock itself can be offset
by matching the sequence of increasing but discounted primary surplus in the future. To
consider sustainability further here transform (2) to get:
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Where we have used the fact that:
qt= rt-pt-ht is the real interest rate minus the rate of growth of real GDP. (4) will always
hold ex post. Looking forward we can write the identity in (4) for time period t+1 as:
[ ] ) 5 ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1
1
+ + +
- - - + = t t t t t t g b E b t q
where bt is known in period t. For this one period constraint to hold in expectational
terms, this must equal the expected discounted net debt-to-GDP ratio in period t+1
conditional on information at time t. For fiscal policy to be sustainable for one time
period (5) must hold. Writing the budget constraint of (5) for subsequent time periods
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is a time-varying real discount factor adjusted for the growth of real GDP with q >0. A
necessary and sufficient condition for sustainability is that as s ®¥the discounted
value of the expected debt-to-GDP ratio converges to zero. This is a transversality
condition and can be expressed as:
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(7) implies that a government is solvent if the transversality condition guarantees the
non- explosiveness of the public debt and when no Ponzi games are allowed, i.e., no
t t t t t t r r h p h p - - + = + + +
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new debt is issued by the government to meet interest payments. Hence it follows that
the current debt is offset by the sum of the current and expected future discounted
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3.2 The critical value of the debt-GDP ratio
Given (8) and using zm(=tmax – gmin) as a definition of the maximum level of the
government’s primary surplus we can determine the critical value of the public debt
ratio (b
C), which will satisfy the sustainability condition:
) 9 ( ) (
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We can also determine the necessary primary surplus, given the initial debt ratio, b0,t h e
real interest rate and the growth rate of real GDP, to stabilize the future debt to GDP
ratio. When r-p > h we can use (2) to define the finite value (b0)t ow h i c hb converges
as:
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The gap between the stabilizing primary surplus (z
**) and the actual primary surplus
(tt-gt) may be used as a sustainability indicator. This indicator gives the magnitude by
which either revenue must be increased or expenditure must be cut relative to income to
stop the debt ratio from growing. (10) seems helpful when assessing empirically the
fiscal policies and the debt situation for developing countries. For example, it would be
useful to compare this with the debt ceiling the IMF may have prescribed for these
countries at the times of their agreeing to stabilization programs.9
From the above analysis it is clear that sustainability of the public debt is essentially an
intertemporal question. In particular, every temporary deficit can be sustainable so long
as it is matched by an adequate future surplus. Most empirical tests on sustainability
9 The task of sustaining a debt ceiling is easier aid than done, particularly in low income countries with
poor tax institutions. This is primarily because investment and productivity of tax institutions would
probably grow at a lower rate than the public debt itself. Thus countries trying to cut the debt by
raising more revenues would probably need to raise taxes – particularly distortionary taxes such as
trade and indirect taxes. This may cut the debt/GDP ratio in the short term but may end up hurting
growth and, therefore, the tax potential in the medium run. Hence the bulk of adjustment must come
from cuts in expenditure. This is typically associated with cuts in social expenditures and spending on
infrastructure. If international donors are willing to provide more concessional loans (or outright
grants) where the interest rate charged is lower than that prevailing, then some of the debt can be
retired using these foreign funds and cut its domestic interest bill. This policy has yet to be tried in a
significant way anywhere.9
apply time series methods and ask whether the observed characteristics of debt-related
variables satisfy the solvency condition in (7). This solvency condition can be tested in
a variety of ways depending on the processes postulated for the primary deficit (gt-tt)
and the real interest rate adjusted for output growth (qt). Hamilton and Flavin (1986)
and Trehan and Walsh (1988), among others, examine the case where (gt-tt) is strictly
exogenous and qt is constant. Wilcox (1989) considers the case with exogenous (gt-tt)
but variable qt. Uctum and Wickens (1997) consider the case where qt is stochastic and
(gt-tt) could be exogenous or endogenous. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume
that the real interest rate adjusted for output growth, qt, is constant with an
unconditional mean. To proceed further now take the first difference of (6), substitute
for Dbt using (4) and simplify to get:
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where Dbt = gt+qbt-1-tt= dt-tt with dt = gt+qbt-1
defined as total government expenditure inclusive of expenditure on goods and services,
transfer payments and interest on the debt. If the government satisfies its intertemporal
budget constraint then the expected limit term in (11) is zero so that the sum of the
current budget surplus (tt-dt) and the expected present discounted value of future
surplus will equal the amount needed to repay the principal and the interest on the initial
debt. When this condition holds, it can be said that the current expected paths of
government spending and taxation are sustainable.
As Papadopoulos and Sidirpoulos (1999) demonstrate if the limit terms on the right-
hand-side of (11) are zero, then a certain cointegrating relationship emerges. Hence
cointegration is a necessary condition for the intertemporal budget constraint to hold. To
see this assume that dt+s and tt+s follow random walks with drift. Thus these variables
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where ad and at are constants and vd and vt are zero-mean stationary processes. Hence
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Given that dt and tt are I(1) and given that (12) and (13) imply stationarity on the right
hand side of (11), the left hand side of (11) must also be stationary for which a
necessary condition is that (14) be stationary, which will be the case when dt and tt are
cointegrated. Thus a test for sustainability of the debt would check for the cointegration
of these two variables if they are I(1). This cointegrating regression would take the
form:
) 15 ( t t t v d + + = b a t
Formally, then, if dt and tt are I(1), the null hypothesis is that dt and tt are cointegrated
and that b =1. If this null hypothesis is not rejected then the public debt is sustainable.
According to Hakkio and Rush (1991) the condition 0<b £1 also guarantees
sustainability. To see this substitute a*+bdt for tt in (2) to get bt = bt-1+kt with
kt º (1-b*)dt +a*. By iterating forward we will get:
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Using (16) the limit term
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Using this relation and a similar expression for
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it can be shown that the expected limit terms on the right-hand-side of (14) are equal to
zero so long as 0<b*£ 1. However, although the limit terms equal zero, the limit of the
undiscounted value of b equals infinity when b* <1. Thus this notion of sustainability is
not as unambiguous as that which requires that b*= 1 .
Tests for sustainability of the fiscal deficit were conducted for the sample of low and
middle-income countries. The data set used was that provided by the IFS CD rom.
Annual data for the period 1950-99 was considered. Time series analysis of the sort11
considered in this paper requires long data sets. For several of the countries such data
was not available. In Table 1 I report results on the internal deficit sustainability tests
for all countries for which a reasonable long data set was available.10
Table 1. Sustainability of internal deficit of low and middle income countries







Costa Rica 1971–1999 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
Yes No
Dominican Republic 1970–1998 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
Yes No
Ecuador 1952–1998 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
No No
Egypt 1977–1997 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
Yes (at 10%) No
El Salvador 1956–1999 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
Yes No
Fiji 1972–1998 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
No No
Ghana 1967–1997 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
No No
Guatemala 1960–1997 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
Yes (at 10%) No





Honduras 1952-1998 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
Yes No
India 1952-1998 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
Yes No
Indonesia 1971 – 1998 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
No No
Iran 1972-1998 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
No No
Ivory Coast 1972 – 1999 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
Yes No
10 A relevant aspect of the tests for sustainability is to ascertain whether the time series involved have a
break. Tests along the lines of Gregory, Hansen and Bruce (1996) were conducted but are not reported
here since the data set involved are not long enough to give robust results. However, results of these
tests are available from the author.12
Table 1. Continued
Jordan 1961 – 1997 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
No No
Kenya 1972- 1999 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
No No
Morocco 1967 – 1995 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
No No
Nepal 1960 – 1996 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
No No
Nigeria 1967 – 1994 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
No No
Pakistan 1955 – 1999 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
No No
Paraguay 1960 - 1993 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
Yes Yes
Philippines 1959 – 1999 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
No No
South Africa 1962 – 1998 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
Yes Yes
Sri Lanka 1952 – 1998 Revenue: I(0)
Expenditure: I(0)
Tanzania 1970 – 1998 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
No No
Thailand 1952 – 1998 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
Yes (at 10%) No.
Tunisia 1974 – 1996 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
No No
Uganda 1972 - 1996 Revenue: I(1)
Expenditure: I(1)
No No
Zambia 1966 – 1996 Revenue: I(0)
Expenditure: I(1)
The results in Table 1 are quite striking. In almost all countries both government
expenditure as well as government revenue are non stationary. In the case of Sri Lanka
both expenditure as well as revenue are stationary whereas in the case of Zambia,
revenue is stationary whereas expenditure is not. Thus Sri Lanka appears to have a
stable fiscal situation whereas the Zambian deficit situation is worrisome. In the rest of
the countries only in the case of Paraguay and South Africa is the deficit sustainability
condition satisfied. In all the other countries, either government expenditures and
revenues are not cointegrated or, if cointegrated, the sustainability restriction does not
hold. Thus, the fiscal deficit in these countries is not sustainable in the long run.13
4 Sustainability of the external debt
In line with the arguments developing the notion of a sustainable internal deficit, a case
can be made to ascertain the sustainability of the external deficit (typically the current
account balance or trade balance) of a country. Just as a government cannot borrow in
the domestic market indefinitely to finance its budgetary deficit, it cannot borrow
indefinitely in global capital markets to finance its trade account deficit. This notion can
be formalized in a manner similar to that expressed above.
It should be noted that it is only rather recently that the notion that large current account
deficits may cause problems has achieved acceptance. As late as 1994, Max Corden
espoused the virtues of the Lawson11 doctrine. Thus Corden (1994) wrote:
The current account is the net result of savings and investment, private
and public. Decentralized optimal decisions on private saving and
investment will lead to a net balance – the current account – which will
also be optimal. There is no reason to presume that governments or
outside observers know better how much private agents should invest
and save than these private agents themselves, unless there are
government- imposed distortions. It follows that an increase in a current
account deficit that results from a shift in private sector behavior should
not be a matter of concern at all. On the other hand, the public budget
balance is a matter of public policy concern and the focus should be on
this.
Notwithstanding the Lawson doctrine large current account imbalances were associated
with currency attacks in Chile (in early 1980s), in the UK and Nordic countries (late
1980s); in Mexico and Argentina (mid 1990s) and in several Asian countries and Russia
in 1997 and thereafter.12 Hence, there seem to be some problems with the Lawson
doctrine. The literature lists the following five reasons for the failure of this doctrine:
i) When there is Ricardian equivalence,13 a public sector deficit will be
interpreted by rational, forward-looking agents as implying higher taxes in the
future. In response, current consumption will fall to pay for these higher taxes.
11 After Nigel Lawson, UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, who in 1988 dismissed the possibility of any
causal link between internal deficit and the current account deficit.
12 It is important to underscore the point that there is a subtle difference between low and middle income
countries with respect to the links between external sustainability and currency crises. Surely, large
current account deficits financed by capital flows are possible only in countries that are successful in
attracting such flows. This would typically be possible primarily in middle income countries. The
banking systems in most low income countries, with the possible exception of India, are simply not
robust enough to attract and retain such flows. Even in India major capital flows, particularly in
crucial infrastrutural areas are attracted by the central government providing counter guarantees to the
investing corporation. This then creates difficulties for Indian balance of payments similar to those for
middle income countries. These problems may become more common with more low-income
countries exploring the counter guarantee route to attracting capital flows. Hence supplementing
domestic savings with foreign savings is a strategy open only to a few countries and even then this is
fraught with some difficulty.
13 For evidence on Ricardian Equivalence in the developed country context see, for example, Bayoumi
and Masson (1998).14
This will then impact on the current account deficit. By assuming that the
current account deficit will be impervious to changes in the fiscal deficit, the
advocates of the Lawson doctrine assume that Ricardian Equivalence does not
hold at all.
ii) Typically in the case of developing countries, many private sector (foreign)
liabilities are contingent liabilities, which, in a crisis, can be changed into
public liabilities under pressure from external creditors. This would then have
impacts on the fiscal deficit. This has happened explicitly in the case of private
banking liabilities in the case of the Asian countries and implicitly in the case
of so called counter guarantees given to independent producers of electricity in
India. As Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) observe, the distinction between
private liability and public liability seems to get blurred when the financial
institution concerned is “too large to fail”.
iii) This follows from Harberger (1985). He argues that there is an externality in
that as developing countries (particularly those with poor credit rating) borrow
more, they face an upward sloping schedule for foreign credit. Furthermore, as
McKinnon and Pil (1995) argue, developing countries may have overly
optimistic estimates of the increase in their permanent income in response to a
policy shift. This over optimism may lead to higher foreign borrowings, which
may exacerbate current account and fiscal deficits.
iv) As the current account deficit worsens there would arise the need to attract
more capital inflows. This would then lead to an appreciation of the real
exchange rate. In a globalizing world in which export promotion is an integral
part of the development strategy, such appreciation would lead to a drop in
growth rates and, therefore, potential tax revenues. Thus Agosin (1994) finds
large swings in the real exchange rate because of temporary capital flows to
significantly depress machinery and equipment investment, and thus long run
growth. This then translates into lower tax revenues.
v) Finally, markets typically look at a country’s total debt and just its internal
public debt. Once the current account deficit exceeds some level, at given
exchange rates, it becomes ever more attractive, from the perspective of an
individual borrower to borrow abroad. This might lead to a speculative bubble.
We now discuss the standard approach to determining the sustainability of the external
deficit. Let Ft be the foreign liabilities of a country. This is typically defined as external
debt less foreign assets including international reserves denominated in real foreign
currency terms. Further let TBt denote the real trade balance expressed in domestic
currency. Foreign liabilities (expressed in domestic currency) will then evolve as:
) 17 ( *) 1 ( 1 t t t t t t TB F e r F e - + = +
Where et is the reciprocal of the average real exchange rate, and rt*i st h ew o r l di n t e r e s t
rate. Clearly a positive trade balance would reduce this country’s external indebtedness
whereas an increase in the world interest rate would worsen it. To simplify the algebra
define (1+rt*) as Rt*. To obtain this country’s external constraint along the lines of
Hakkio and Rush (1991) and Chalk and Hemming (2000) we solve (17) forward to get15
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(18) is to be interpreted as this country’s intertemporal external sustainability condition.
Meaningful statistical tests of sustainability have to be derived from (18). For external
sustainability we must rule out Ponzi games with external debt. In other words net
foreign liabilities cannot grow faster than the interest rate, i.e.
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is a necessary condition for external sustainability. This requires that
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(19) makes explicit the fact that external debt is sustainable only insofar as it can be
financed by future trade surpluses. In the extant literature this requirement has been
interpreted to imply stationarity of the current account deficit or the cointegration of
exports and imports inclusive of net interest payments, if exports and imports are I(1). A
simple way of interpreting the sustainability of (19) is to divide both sides by output to
get
(1+qt)(1+ht) ft+1 = R*tft -tbt (20)
where lower case letters denote values as proportions of GDP and qt is the real
appreciation of the domestic currency. Net foreign liabilites as a ratio of GDP are
reduced by a positive trade balance, an appreciating currency, or by faster economic
















net foreign liabilities will increase relative to output over time. This can be regarded as
unsustainable.
5 The twin deficits
It is straightforward to connect sustainability on the domestic fiscal and the external side
– the so-called twin deficits. To see this write the national income identity as:
Yt = Ct + It + Gt – Tt + Xt – Mt
where Yt is national income, Ct is private consumption, I is investment, and X and M are
exports and imports respectively. Defining private saving as income minus consumption
we have:
St – It – Dt = TBt (22)
where Dt is the government budgetary deficit. Using covered interest parity and
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where (1+r)=R.
Using the internal and external sustainability conditions, we can write (23) as
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With both fiscal and external sustainability the “lim” terms in (24) will disappear and
we will have:
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If there is domestic fiscal sustainability but the external deficit is unsustainable then the
R* term gets added to (25). Thus:
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If the external deficit is sustainable but the domestic deficit is not, then we will have
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(26) and (27) make it explicit that both the internal and external deficits figure in the
government budget constraint.
We report some results on sustainability of the external deficit in Table 2. Time series
properties of exports, imports and the trade balance are reported. Some countries like
Nepal for which the internal sustainability result could be worked out do not have long
enough external data series so that they are not reported in Table 2. Even middle income
countries such as South Africa and low-income with well developed markets such as
India, do not perform well in the external sustainability test. Paraguay seems to satisfy
external as well as internal deficit sustainability. In addition, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana,
Iran, Thailand and Tunisia have stationary trade balances so their external deficits
would appear sustainable on this count. However, in the case of Tunisia and Iran
exports and imports are not cointegrated so external sustainability becomes suspect.
Even in the case of Sri Lanka the coefficient on imports is much higher than that on
exports. In the case of Zambia this coefficient is fifty times higher.14
Table 2. Sustainability of external deficit of low and middle income countries






Costa Rica 1971 – 1999 I(1) Cointegrated. The null
that imports are three
times the size of exports
is accepted.
I(1)
Dominican Republic 1970 – 1998 I(1). Cointegrated with each
other and with net factor
payments from abroad.
I(1)
Ecuador 1952 - 1998 I(0) I(0)
Egypt 1961 – 1999 I(0) I(0)
Fiji 1965 – 1993 I(1) Not cointegrated. I(1)
Ghana 1957 – 1997 I(1) Not cointegrated I(0)
Guatemala 1952 – 1998 I(1) Cointegrated. I(1)
Guyana 1954-1997 I(1) Not cointegrated I(1)
14 One largely unresolved issue is whether net FDI flows should be included in the calculations for
sustainable current account deficits. Frankel and Rose (1996) find in a panel of 100 developing
countries from 1971 to 1991 that a high ratio of FDI to debt is associated with a low likelihood of a
currency crash. Between 1970 and 1982, for example, Singapore ran a current account deficit between
12.1% to 20% of GDP. Almost one half of the gap consisted of FDI. The savings rate within this
period doubled from 21% to 40%, the economy grew at an average rate of 8% and there was no
currency crash. Hence, there is some presumption that since FDI is determined by long-term
considerations, generates positive externalities and does not exert pressures on the real exchange rate
if it is the outcome of a privatization program, is in a different category when reckoning sustainability
of current account deficit. However, if capital is fungible this optimism may be misplaced as Reisen
(1999) argues.18
Table 2. Continued




Honduras 1952 – 1999 Exports I(0), Imports I(1). I(1)




Indonesia 1962 – 1999 I(1) Cointegrated with each other. I(1)
Iran 1961 – 1998 I(1) Not cointegrated. I(0)
Ivory Coast 1952-1999 I(1) Cointegrated. Null hypothesis
that imports are ten times
exports not rejected.
I(1)
Jordan 1961 – 1998 I(1) Not cointegrated I(1)
Kenya 1972-1999 I(1) Not cointegrated I(1)
Morocco 1954 – 1998 I(1) Cointegrated with each other
and with net factor payments
from abroad.
I(1)
Nigeria 1953- 1993 I(1) Cointegrated with each other
and with net factor payments
from abroad.
I(1)
Pakistan 1962 – 1998 I(1) Cointegrated with each other
and with net factor payments
from abroad.
I(1)
Paraguay 1952 – 1997 I(0) I(0)
Philippines 1952 – 1998 I(1) Cointegrated with each other
and with net factor payments
from abroad (at 7%).
I(1)19
Table 2. Continued




South Africa 1952 – 1998 I(1) Not cointegrated. I(1)
Sri Lanka 1952 – 1998 I(1) Cointegrated, with coefficient
of imports significantly larger.
I(0)
Tanzania 1962 – 1998 I(1) Cointegrated with each other
and with net factor payments
from abroad.
I(1)
Thailand 1952 – 1997 I(1) Cointegrated. The restriction
that the coefficient on imports
is half that on exports is
accepted.
I(0)
Tunisia 1962 – 1999 I(1) Not cointegrated. I(0)
Zambia 1959 – 1997 I(1) Cointegrated. The restriction
that the coefficient on imports
is 50 times that on exports is
not rejected.
I(1)
It is quite apparent, then, that developing countries have considerable difficulties in
meeting internal and external deficit sustainability conditions. The fact that external
sustainability conditions15 are hard to meet would imply the need for continual capital
inflow in order to keep the balance of payments in equilibrium. This would necessitate
the maintenance of a substantial rate of return wedge between domestic and foreign
rates of return. In particular, this would translate into substantially higher domestic rates
of interest as compared to global interest rates. This acts as a drag on higher growth and
makes the problem of debt servicing harder, which, in turn, exacerbates the problem of
internal fiscal deficit.16
15 There is an argument that financial bailouts by international bodies such as the IMF lead to an adverse
selection problem in that countries know that since they will be bailed out they may follow imprudent
macroeconomic policies. IIF (1999) however, reports that the evidence on this is weak—particularly
in the case that has often been cited as the most important example of such imprudent macroeconomic
behaviour—the Mexico financial support package of 1995. It has been argued that this package
caused moral hazard that was a force behind the large volume of lending at low spreads that occurred
in emerging markets in 1996 through mid-1997. On the contrary, the study finds that the empirical
evidence does not support the moral hazard diagnosis. Instead, the decline in emerging market spreads
can be explained statistically by buoyant international liquidity conditions (as measured by high-yield
US corporate spreads) and (to a much smaller extent) by improving economic fundamentals in
borrowing economies.
16 A good illustration of this point comes from South Africa. The government has been quite prudent in
terms of domestic financing, despite facing large demands for public spending to rectify the
inequalities of apartheid and accelerate employment growth. But the need to defend the rand against
speculative attack, has led to domestic interest rates significantly above world rates for the last three to20
The higher internal fiscal deficit in many of these countries also contributes towards
higher interest rates and the crowding out of private investment. In addition, in several
of these countries the fact that the domestic bond market is rather thin, implies that the
proportion of the deficit that is covered by money or non-bond finance as opposed to
bond finance remains disturbingly high. This is reported in Table 3 for select countries
for the 1990s. This table compares non-bond financing in the developing countries used
in this study with that in a few OECD countries.
Table 3. Forms of financing of the government deficit
Country 1996 1997 1998
NBF DF F ratio ratiof NBF DF F ratio ratiof NBF DF F ratio ratiof NBF
Costa Rica 72.54
Dominican Republic 518.2 -844.8
Ecuador
Egypt 4411 5178
El Salvador 501.4 -399.9 462.9 -1.25 1.08 813.9 -143 580.7 -5.69 0.98





India* 577 638.9 668.8 0.90 0.86 852.9 860 872 0.99 425.5 908.8 0.47
Indonesia -3511 -3521 -6180 1.00 0.57 7613 8886 4212 0.86 0.21 -21851 -21851 1
Iran
Ivory Coast
Jordan -15.1 -126.6 66.3 0.12 -0.23 -11.6 -38.6 163.3 0.30
Kenya 5795 5795 4785 1 1.21 -14.21
Morocco 0.27
Nepal 3500 3500 10981 1 0.32 2318 3968 10909 0.58 -0.21 3323 5572 0.60 991
Nigeria
Pakistan 169477 189788 0.76
Paraguay
Phillippines -54419 -251 -6256 216.81 22219 5254 -1564 4.23
South Africa 2516 2516 31846 1.00 -0.40 6198 6198 22852 1 -3174 -3174 1
Sri Lanka 14827 49753 59913 0.30 0.47 -8397 30276 40234 -0.28 19366 71363 0.27
Tanzania -0.62
Thailand -93101 -1E+05 -1E+05 0.84 32038 31747 41956 1.01 -0.23 -98394 98162 -1.00




Australia -179 -3123 4840 0.06 -0.04 1285 1202 -2062 1.07 0.32 -11598 -11676 -16368 0.99 0.71
Austria 22 87.85 99.71 0.25 0.22 -15.63 68.6 67.24 -0.23
Finland 2734 36203 36571 0.08 0.07 4090 34419 15523 0.12
France -36.1 397.9 413.3 -0.09 -0.09 284.4
UK 9449 20446 27440 0.46 0.34 1085 18064 16136 0.06 67 -4665 -4876 -0.01 -0.01
USA -40.63 -66.67 114.6 0.61 -0.35 6.98 -164.9 21.72 -0.04 37.59 -64.87 -70.69 -0.58 -0.53
Source: Government Financial Statistics, IMF
Notes: DF= Domestic Finance, F=Foreign Finance, Ratio =NBF/DF, Ratiof=NBF/F, NBF = DF minus
Short term and long term bonds financing plus local government financing
*1997 and 1998 are provisional figures
To the extent that non-bond finance is relied upon, there exists an automatic link
between the fiscal deficit and the credit side of the central bank’s balance sheet. The
government issues bonds to be “bought” by a captive central bank. This changes the
monetary base and, hence, the money supply in the economy. The independence of
four years with damaging effects on private sector investment and growth. For aid dependent
economies such as Tanzania this problem may be less severe insofar as they rely on aid inflows to
finance the current account deficit on concessional or grant terms. In the case of Mozambique, for
example, much of the external deficit—which widened during recontruction—as essential imports
exceeded war-damaged exports is aid financed. In this case, then, the focus of attention should ideally
be the interenal and not the extenal deficit.21
monetary and fiscal policy is compromised and the ability of the central bank to pursue
stabilization policies17 is reduced.18
Some have argued that, if this effect was quantitatively strong, there would be a link
between the fiscal deficit and inflation—particularly if developing countries wish to use
seignorge revenues to close the budgetary gap.19 However, in developing countries this
association is weak. Thus, de Hann and Zelhorst (1990) and Easterly and Schmidt-
Hebbel (1993) find a positive correlation between inflation and the fiscal deficit in
developing countries only when the inflation rate is high and there is a clear seignorage
motive to get additional revenue from money creation. However, Buffie (1999) argues
that this result can be ascribed to the behaviour of the public sector wage cycle and that
the relation between the fiscal deficit and inflation remains intact once this is factored
out. Buffie’s argument is that once public expenditure is restrained, perhaps as part of
an IMF stabilization program, there is the clear expectation that any cut in the real wage
in the public sector that this involves would not be expected to last long. It would be
expected that once the strictures of the program are lifted, the real wage would climb
back up. The disinflationary program, therefore, lacks credibility. Buffie considers two
possible cases:
i) in which the low wage phase is followed by a high wage phase of equal length
so as to leave the average wage remains unchanged over the wage cycle.
ii) The low real wage phase is followed by a return of the real wage to its
prestabilization level.
In the first case, since the market expects the real wage rate to rise, inflation picks up
even as the deficit falls. It is indeed possible that deficit and inflation will be inversely
correlated with high inflation prevailing through the low deficit phase. In the second
case this result is weaker and depends upon money and consumption being Edgeworth
substitutes. The upshot of this argument that the links between fiscal deficit and
inflation remain intact even when there is little observed correlation between the two.20
17 Schuknecht (1999) argues that using a nominal anchor like a fixed exchange rate regime may not be
sufficient to pursue stabilization objectives. He models electoral business cycles in the case of 25
developing countries and shows that governments indeed try to improve electoral prospects by
pursuing expansionary fiscal policies around election time. This is more likely to occur, ceteris
paribus, in an economy with a nominal anchor such as a fixed nominal exchange rate. These episodes
would than be followed by higher inflation and exacerbation of fiscal deficit pressures.
18 In this context, Sargent (1999) argues that monetary policy can be constrained by fiscal policy
whenever fiscal deficits grow large enough to require monetization. This can happen in developed as
well as developing countries and irrespective of whether the central bank is independent or not. In
such situations the central bank loses its ability to influence income or interest rates and can influence
only the time path of prices.
19 Issler and Lima (2000) illustrate the importance of this phenomenon in the case of Brazil. They show
that not only is Ricardian Equivalence important (so that the fiscal deficit and the current account
deficit are linked), but also that without seignorage revenues the Brazilian deficit would not be
sustainable.
20 To be sure, Buffie’s argument is valid principally for the non sub Saharan Africa region countries. In
low income countries of this region such as Zambia, low real wage phases have not typically beeen
f o l l o w e db yh i g hr e a lw a g ep a h s e s .22
6 Fiscal policy, capital flows and the money supply process
In the presently rapidly globalizing world economy, a liberal capital regime is often
promoted in the interest of optimal international allocation of capital. This change has
been assisted by an emerging consensus, both in academic and policy making circles, on
the type of policies that promote growth with equity. The new development model
emphasizes macroeconomic stability, competitive market structures, globalization
(integration into the world economy) and a role for the government and fiscal policy
that emphasizes facilitating the growth of the market and the private sector.
To achieve these objectives public finances must be put in order and this paper has spelt
out some of the conditions under which this will be possible. Exchange rate policy
should emphasize a reduction in the rate of inflation. Further, stabilization policy
packages advocated by the IMF and the dire necessity of attracting international capital
flows has tempted many developing countries to pursue fiscal policies to attract capital
inflows. These include maintaining interest rate differentials, providing favorable tax
treatment to foreign capital and the like.
Starting from the late 1980s, developing countries have experienced surges in capital
flows. According to the World Economic Outlook (1996), net capital inflows into
developing countries, as measured by the capital account surplus (inclusive of errors
and omissions) increased from $18 billion in 1988 to $164 billion in 1993 and $250
billion in 1995. Most of this increase has occurred in the private sector. Net private
capital flows to developing countries consisting of FDI, portfolio equity, bond issues,
loans and other liabilities, rose from $33 billion in 1988 to $167 billion in 1995. FDI
and portfolio investments account for over 70% of these flows. Some information on
these flows is provided in Table 4. Some aspects of the regional distribution of such
flows are portrayed in Table 5.













1990 56.9 43.9 19.4 24.5 100.8 -
1991 62.6 60.5 26.2 34.4 123.1 22.0
1992 54.0 98.3 52.2 46.1 152.3 37.6
1993 53.3 167.0 100.0 67.0 220.2 -
1994 45.5 178.1 89.6 88.5 223.6 -
1995 53.4 201.5 96.1 105.4 254.9 64.2
1996 32.2 275.9 149.5 126.4 308.1 30.7
1997 39.1 299.0 135.5 163.4 338.1 21.6
1998 47.9 227.1 72.1 155.0 275.0 10.2
Source: Global Development Finance, The World Bank (1999).23
Table 5 Regional Distribution of Capital Flows to Developing Countries




30.5 8.8 163.4 158.0 226.9 231.1 202.7




-10.5 6.5 54.1 85.0 20.6 42.9 40.6
Other flows 29.8 -11.0 46.2 -2.4 122.0 83.2 42.7
Asia 15.8 16.7 64.3 69.3 96.9 111.5 56.2
Latin
America
26.3 -16.6 47.5 43.4 57.7 67.1 83.8
Other -11.6 8.7 51.6 45.3 72.3 52.5 62.7
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (1995) for figures upto 1989 and IMF World Economic Outlook
(1998) for other years.
Such large capital flows have turned out to be a major welcome as well as worrisome
macro economic development for these countries. Some of the obvious positive features
are: (i) acquiring capital for higher economic growth; (ii) smoothing out consumption
over time; and (iii) acquiring new technology and expertise through FDI.
At the same time, these inflows have also posed major challenges for the conduct of
monetary policy. Thus there is a tendency for the real exchange rate to appreciate as a
result of the build-up of foreign exchange reserves and associated expansion of
monetary base, greater speculative activity on the part of the domestic asset markets and
possible disruption associated with sudden reversal of flows. Capital inflows lead to
increased expenditures some of which will spill over onto tradable goods. This will
increase the size of the trade deficit. If this were the only adjustment required, there
would be no grounds for concern because the higher trade deficit will be financed
directly by the capital inflow with no disequilibrium in the market for non-tradable
goods. Thus the principal reason to worry about the trade deficit would be to understand
whether the implied external debt was sustainable. However, some of the additional
expenditures would spill over onto the non-tradable goods sector. The size of the
tradable goods sector will, therefore, shrink and that of the non-tradable sector rise.
Further, this sudden increase in the balance sheet on both the asset and liability sides for
the banking system may make it possible to finance investment/consumption decisions
of agents that are not sustainable over the long run. This would lead to a further external
current account deficit, increasing the private sector’s indebtedness and the emergence
of non-performing assets. Unless sterilized, these additions to the debit and credit sides
of the financial sector’s balance sheet will lead to inflationary consequences. Further,
the buildup of international debt through recurrent current account deficits can
undermine the country’s creditworthiness. If the domestic monetary authority attempts
to sterilize the capital flows, the domestic monetary base becomes endogenous.
However, sterilization may not insulate the economy from the effects of capital inflows24
in these inflows are triggered by an increase in the domestic money demand that raises
domestic interest rates. In addition, it might have quasi-fiscal costs for the central bank
to the extent that monetary authorities purchase low-yielding foreign assets and sell
high-yielding domestic assets. Moreover, if sterilization were achieved through
increased reserve requirements, it would act as a tax on the banking system and may
promote disintermediation. Hence, sterilization is at best a partial solution.
It follows, therefore, that money supply becomes endogenous or, at least, hard to target
because of the presence of capital flows. (Some suggestive evidence of this variety for
the Indian economy is presented in the Appendix to this paper.) Hence, it is imperative
from the point of view of attaining macroeconomic stability that forces of endogeneity
of money supply emerging from the fiscal side be abated. If the money supply has to
bear the burden of adjustment from the fiscal side as well as that of international capital
flows, it would be difficult to pursue stabilization policy.
7 Conclusions
This paper has considered some aspects of the effects of fiscal policy on
macroeconomic adjustment in developing countries. Broadly, two areas of concern are
delineated. First, is spelling out the conditions under which the internal and external
debts are sustainable and pointing out the role of the “twin deficits”. In this context this
paper presents some evidence on the sustainability of the internal and external deficits
in the context of some developing countries. The second broad theme of this paper is
tracing the sources of endogeneity in money supply to fiscal policy and international
capital flows and pointing out the difficulties faced by stabilization policy under these
conditions.
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Appendix One source of endogeneity of the money supply
This appendix models one possible source of endogeneity of the money supply—capital
flows—and illustrates it using recent Indian data. The surge in capital flows to India in
the 1990s has come in different forms through the routes of FDI and portfolio flows as
compared to the debt-created flows through non resident Indian (NRI) and other forms
of banking capital in the 1980s. The magnitudes of such flows have been on the rise in
the 1990s with significant macroeconomic implications.
This increase in capital flows occurred against the background of a relatively lower
Current Account Deficit (CAD)-GDP ratio. This is to be contrasted with the capital flow
of the 1980s with a dominance of debt-created flows in the context of high CAD-GDP
ratio, such that the capital flows financed the current account deficits with no significant
monetary effects. As such, the surge in capital flows of the 1990s resulted in accretion
of international reserves with obvious monetary impacts, (partial) sterilization programs
of the Reserve Bank notwithstanding.
Our approach to understanding the implications of this capital flow models the impact
of capital flows on the monetary process by developing an interest rate reaction function
along with conventional money demand function (Kamin and Wood (1997)).
Let the money demand function be:
log (M3/P)=a - b i + d y + e M (A1.1)
where domestic interest rates is i and real income is y.
If money demand function is stable, then capital inflows can affect M3 in the long run
by affecting its demand—through the domestic interest rate i. We posit an interest rate
function in which the monetary authority sets the domestic interest rate in response to
prevailing level of inflation, output growth and capital flows. Increase in inflation leads
to a rise interest rates to keep the real interest rate from declining while increase in
output growth elicits a counter-cyclical rise in interest rates, and increase in capital
flows induces the authorities to lower the interest rate. The interest rate reaction
function is:
i = v + l P
^ + f y
^ - q KA +e1 (A1.2)
where a hat (
^ ) refers to log change i.e., P
^ = log Pt - log Pt-1 etc. B a s e do n( A 1 . 2 )a n d
the money demand function (A1.1), the impact of KA on i and then the impact of i on
M3 can be calculated as:
dM3 / dK A=( dM3 / di)*di/ dK A=( - b )( - q)>0 ( A 1 . 3 )
Using this framework, dynamic versions of money demand and interest rate reaction
functions were estimated separately for the Indian economy. Through simulation a
counterfactual path of interest rates and money balances that would have occurred had
there been no surge in capital flows the way they did was then charted.
Then capital inflows were added as an explanatory variable in the money demand
function which was then estimated using two-stage least squares since the interest rate28
in the money demand function already incorporates the effects of capital inflows. The
money demand function is:
log (M3/P)=a - b i + d y + e M
= a - b (v + l P
^ + f y
^ - q KA +e1 )+d y+eM
= a - b (v + l P
^ + f y
^ +e1 )+bqKA + d y+eM (A1.4)
where the terms within the parentheses represent that part of interest rates which is not
determined by capital flows while the qKA term represents that part of interest rates
which is determined by capital flows. We estimate equation (A1.4) using a two-stage
least square procedure in which we first estimate a partial version of the interest rate
equation:
i = v + l P
^ + f y
^ + s Z + ei (A1.5)
where Z represents other potential instruments that are correlated with the interest rates i
but not with KA. We then take the fitted values for i, (denoted as i’), and use them as
explanatory variables in the second stage regression:
log (M3/P)=a - b i’+bqKA + d y + e M- b eI (A1.6)
We use the estimated version of the above equation to determine how the money supply
would have evolved had capital flows not surged in the 1990s and then compare with
those calculated using our first method.
In implementing this approach, we estimate error correction versions of the static
money demand and the interest rate functions. Two conventional measures of capital
inflows are used: the capital account which measures the net flow of capital and the
change in international reserves which measures the extent to which capital flows would
increase the monetary base with no sterilization.
Results using monthly data from 1981M6 to 2000M3 are reported in Tables A1.1 to
A1.5. (IIP stands for index of industrial production and WPI for the wholesale price
index). In Table A1.1 the capital flow account term is insignificant. This is
understandable since the major part of this period did not experience significant capital
flows since significant such flows started actually from the year 1993.29
Table A1.1. Full period parsimonious results for interest rate reaction function on monthly data
(with capital flow)
Dependent Variable: Change in call money market rate of interest
226 observations used for estimation from 1981-6 to 2000-3
Regressor Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics [Prob]
INPT 1.6334 .77517 2.1071 [.036]
INT(-1) -.24605 .066517 -3.6991[.000]
DLWPI(-1) 182.378 98.4415 1.8527 [.065]
DLIIP(-1) -11.7594 3.7971 -3.0970[.002]
DLNFA(-1) -1.9977 2.3099 -.86484[.388]
DINT(-1) -.15773 .081512 -1.9351[.054]
DINT(-2) -.25802 .076734 -3.3625[.001]
DINT(-3) -.23286 .070343 -3.3104[.001]
DINT(-4) -.10029 .066947 -1.4980[.136]
DDLWPI(-1) -231.4764 86.6946 -2.6700[.008]
DDLWPI(-2) -225.1815 79.6050 -2.8287[.005]
DDLWPI(-3) -186.9466 72.1787 -2.5901[.010]
DDLWPI(-4) -171.1842 68.5435 -2.4975 [.013]
DDLWPI(-5) -164.0979 58.8729 -2.7873 [.006]
DDLWPI(-6) -123.0555 54.9079 -2.2411 [.026]
DDLWPI(-7) -116.9016 46.1432 -2.5334 [.012]
DDLWPI(-8) -93.3639 39.3610 -2.3720 [.019]
R-Bar-Squared = 0.25852 ; D-W Statistic 2.011
Table A1.2 gives the parsimonious equation for the interest rate for the period of
heightened capital flows since 1993M4. As can be seen, there is a significant
improvement in goodness of fit with highly significant coefficients for lagged capital
flows and for changes in capital flows with various lags.
Table A1.3 gives the parsimonious equation for the interest rate for the period of
heightened capital flows, after dropping the capital flow terms from the OLS regression.
As can be expected, there is a significant decline in goodness of fit, and only the lagged
interest rate term remains significant.30
Table A1.2. Part period parsimonious results for interest rate reaction function on monthly data
(with capital flows)
Dependent Variable: Change in call money market rate of interest
84 observations used for estimation from 1993-4 to 2000-3
Regressor Coefficient Std. Error T-statistic [Prob]
INPT 2.5248 1.6373 1.5421[.130]
INT(-1) -.77183 .11648 -6.6265 [.000]
DLNFA(-1) -39.9240 21.5172 -1.8554 [.070]
DLIIP(-1) 498.0998 196.8923 2.5298 [.015]
DLWPI(-1) 494.2467 262.6650 1.8817 [.066]
DINT(-4) .34039 .11296 3.0132 [.004]
DINT(-5) .45195 .14546 3.1072 [.003]
DINT(-6) .38373 .16352 2.3467 [.023]
DINT(-7) .40406 .15921 2.5379 [.015]
DINT(-8) .28202 .14535 1.9402 [.058]
DDLNFA(-1) 61.4968 19.4698 3.1586 [.003]
DDLNFA(-2) 50.6345 18.4804 2.7399 [.009]
DDLNFA(-3) 48.0017 16.2335 2.9570 [.005]
DDLNFA(-4) 48.5367 13.8977 3.4924 [.001]
DDLNFA(-5) 36.0854 10.8063 3.3393 [.002]
DDLWPI(-1) -328.7736 252.5748 -1.3017 [.200]
DDLWPI(-2) -542.2812 251.4040 -2.1570 [.036]
DDLWPI(-3) -300.3750 246.7512 -1.2173 [.230]
DDLWPI(-4) -324.5521 229.9105 -1.4116[ .165]
DDLWPI(-5) -400.7135 214.8934 -1.8647 [.069]
DDLWPI(-6) -391.0953 202.8677 -1.9278 [.060]
DDLWPI(-7) -499.5484 194.2671 -2.5715 [.013]
DDLWPI(-8) -693.2791 185.8752 -3.7298 [.001]
DDLWPI(-9) -636.5860 173.3911 -3.6714 [.001]
DDLWPI(-10) -429.0230 149.1816 -2.8758 [.006]
DDLWPI(-11) -132.1504 127.3181 -1.0380 [.305]
DDLIIP(-1) -499.7257 186.8652 -2.6743 [.010]31
Regressor Coefficient Std. Error T-statistic [Prob]
DDLIIP(-2) -428.2095 169.4123 -2.5276 [.015]
DDLIIP(-3) -352.3203 151.8819 -2.3197 [.025]
DDLIIP(-4) -323.8446 135.3321 -2.3930 [.021]
DDLIIP(-5) -328.7223 119.8221 -2.7434 [.009]
DDLIIP(-6) -303.3085 104.7861 -2.8945 [.006]
DDLIIP(-7) -293.9443 90.2261 -3.2579 [.002]
DDLIIP(-8) -277.4831 76.5747 -3.6237 [.001]
DDLIIP(-9) -246.3014 63.4092 -3.8843 [.000]
DDLIIP(-10) -187.6575 50.0376 -3.7503 [.000]
DDLIIP(-11) -124.9295 35.9202 -3.4780 [.001]
DDLIIP(-12) -57.1440 22.7651 -2.5102 [.016]
R-Bar-Squared = 0.45389; DW-statistic = 2.1338
Table A1.3. Part period parsimonious results for interest rate reaction function on monthly data
(without capital flows)
Dependent Variable: Change in call money market rate of interest
84 observations used for estimation from 1993-4 to 2000-3
Regressor Coefficient Std. Error T-statistic [Prob]
INPT 4.7075 1.1677 4.0314 [0.000]
Interest Rate(-1) -0.48036 0.095312 -5.0398 [0.000]
DLIIP (-1) -3.4389 8.2116 -0.41879 [0.676]
DLWPI (-1) -42.2460 92.1950 -0.45822 [0.648]
R-Bar-Squared = 0.21659; DW-statistic = 2.0454; F-statistic. F(3,80) = 8.6492 [0.00]
Estimates of the money demand function with and without capital flows are presented in
Table A1.4 and Table A1.5. As per expectation, capital flow terms turn out to be
significant.32
Table A1.4. Part period parsimonious results for money demand function on monthly data (with
capital flows)
Dependent Variable: Change in Logarithm of Real M3
84 observations used for estimation from 1993-4 to 2000-3
Regressor Coefficient Std. Error T-statistics [Prob]
INPT -0.19774 0.054125 -3.6534 [.000]
DINT(-1) .3463E-3 .2615E-3 1.3242 [.189]
DINT(-2) 0.6541E-3 0.2808E-3 2.3292 [.023]
DINT(-3) 0.5606E-3 0.2787E-3 2.0119 [.048]
DINT(-4) 0.5016E-3 0.2636E-3 1.9029 [.061]
LIIP(-1) 0.058229 0.019485 2.9884 [.004]
DLIIP 0.030781 0.022710 1.3554 [.179]
LNFA(-1) -0.011308 0.0062094 -1.8211 [.073]
DLNFA 0.10022 0.033548 2.9875 [.004]
R-Bar-Squared = 0.23311; DW-statistic = 2.1141; F-statistic F(8,75) = 4.1536 [.000]33
Results for the parsimonious equation without capital flow terms are reported in Table
A1.5. As can be seen, there is a drop in the goodness of fit and interest rate terms
become insignificant.
Table A1.5. Part period parsimonious results for money demand function on monthly data
(without capital flows)
Dependent Variable: Change in Logarithm of Real M3
84 observations used for estimation from 1993-4 to 2000-3
Regressor Coefficient Std. Error T-statistics [Prob]
INPT -0.043556 0.046521 -0.93625 [.352]
DINT(-1) -0.3711E-4 0.2804E-3 -0.13235 [.895]
DINT(-2) 0.4138E-3 0.2975E-3 1.3909 [.168]
DINT(-3) 0.1897E-3 0.2965E-3 0.63980 [.524]
DINT(-4) 0.2906E-3 0.2790E-3 1.0417 [.301]
LIIP(-1) 0.0088042 0.0082096 1.0724 [.287]
DLIIP(-1) 0.043689 0.022347 1.9551 [.054]
DLIIP(-2) 0.058878 0.024510 2.4022 [.019]
DLIIP(-3) 0.086227 0.024517 3.5171 [.001]
DLIIP(-4) 0.054035 0.022056 2.4499 [.017]
R-Bar-Squared = 0.17615; DW-statistic = 2.3377; F-statistic. F(9,74) = 2.9718 [.005]
Charts 1 and 2 portray the fitted values of changes in the rate of interest and real money
demand vis-à-vis their actual values. Next we simulate the interest rate function to
obtain the rate of interest that would have prevailed had there been no capital flows. For
this exercise, we use the assumption that the coefficient of term relating to capital flows
is zero. Chart 2 plots the simulated interest rate vis-à-vis the actual. Using these
simulated rates of interest, the money demand function as per equation without capital
flows is estimated and plotted vis-à-vis the actual money demand.34
Chart 1. Changes in Actual (DINT) and Fitted Values (DINTHAT1) of Interest
Rates on Monthly Data
Chart 2. Changes in Actual (DINT) and Simulated Values (DINTHAT2) of
Interest Rates on Monthly Data35
This analysis leads to some conclusions.
By adopting a framework involving construction of interest rate reaction function along
with a money demand function in the framework of a two-stage recursive system, we
are able to model the impact of capital flows on money supply in India. Controlling for
inflation and output at the levels they were at, simulation analysis provides a useful way
Chart 4. Changes in Actual (DLREALM3) and Simulated Values (DRLM32) of
Logarithmic Real Money Demand on Monthly Data
Chart 3. Changes in Actual (DLREALM3) and Fitted Values (DRLM31) of
Logarithmic Real Money Demand on Monthly Data36
of constructing a counterfactual exercise to visualize the scenario that would have
emerged in the absence of the influence of capital flows on money supply. Such an
exercise points towards a definite monetary impact of capital flows especially in the
1990s. Such a phenomenon could turn out to be extremely important especially if there
are limits to the central bank’s ability to sterilize because of high quasi-fiscal cost or
some other impediments.
Furthermore, the actual path vis-à-vis the counter factual simulated scenario of interest
rates and change in real money demand do broadly follow a similar pattern. This may be
a pointer to the fact that factors purely domestic to the economy (other than capital
flows) remain quite important in the money supply process. As the magnitude of capital
flows grows, the relative influence of these domestic factors may decline.UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER)
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